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MARITAL AGREEMENTS IN CONTEMPLATION 
OF DIVORCE 
BARBARA KLARMAN* 
Since the end of World War II, the United States has witnessed a 
substantial upheaval in family life. The rate of divorce has risen 
dramatically and the rate of remarriage has followed suit. 1 One of 
the most striking features in this upheaval is the increasing number 
of married women who are gainfully employed outside of the home 
in either full- or part-time work. 2 This growing economic indepen-
dence of women is perhaps both a cause and an effect of the rising 
divorce rates. 
Romantic notions that marriage is forever are beginning to give 
way to the more realistic assessments that marriages indeed may 
not last. 3 The pressure has been mounting for ways to provide 
economic planning to parties in the relatively likely event that their 
marriages terminate in divorce. The purpose of this article is to 
focus on one method of obtaining such planning: the marital 
agreement setting forth the support and property distribution 
which the parties would follow in the event of divorce. This article 
will review the law regarding marital agreements in contemplation 
of divorce as it exists in the United States, and the policy consider-
ations relevant to it. The article will also describe a novel attempt 
in Michigan to deal with the matter legislatively, and will suggest a 
further change which would make this a fairer method of settling 
property interests in the event of a divorce. 
I. THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
Under prevailing law in the United States, agreements made in 
contemplation of divorce are considered void as against public 
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I See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
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2 Serrin, Prognosis for Families: They Will Live On, Detroit Free Press, Feb. 11, 1977, at 
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policy. 4 While numerous reasons have been given for this rule, 5 it 
is commonly asserted that because the state has an interest in 
every marriage, it is against public policy to enforce agreements 
that provide for or facilitate its dissolution. 6 Underlying this 
rationale is a fear that if a spouse can obtain financial benefit in the 
event of divorce, he or she may thus be encouraged to seek a 
divorce, possibly leaving the other spouse to be supported by the 
state. The rule has become so firmly entrenched in American legal 
thought that many courts have refused to reconsider it or its under-
lying assumptions. 7 Moreover, many courts have so strictly con-
strued the rule that they have voided provi'sions that even consider 
divorce as a possibility, regardless of the circumstances surround-
ing the execution of the agreement. 8 
In contrast to the rule invalidating agreements in contemplation 
of divorce is the rule favoring agreements in contemplation of 
death. In virtually every jurisdiction, prospective or present 
spouses may contractually determine division of their property in 
the event of the death of one of the parties.9 These agreements are 
favored as allegedly promoting marital tranquility, 10 and are gener-
ally enforced if the parties have made a full disclosure of their 
assets and if the contract was not the product of fraud, duress, or 
undue influence.11 The public policy reasons which have caused 
courts to void agreements contemplating divorce are usually not 
considered relevant to agreements contemplating death. The 
courts instead focus on the spouses' interests in the preservation of 
their respective estates and on their understandable desire to avoid 
disputes concerning property after one spouse has died. 12 
Although agreements in contemplation of death and those in 
contemplation of divorc·e arise from similar concerns, courts, until 
recently, have persisted in treating them differently. One of the 
4 See 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS§ 90-27 
(Cum. Supp. 1976). 
5 See the excellent discussion in Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
(!}2, 704-05 (1972). 
6 See, e.g., Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1950). 
7 See, e.g., Werlein v. Werlein, 27 Wis. 2d 237, 241, 133 N.W.2d 820, 822 (1965). 
8 For example, the dissent in Fricke construed the majority as holding that "under no 
circumstances may the parties contemplating marriage recognize divorce as a possibility ... 
and make financial provision for the contingency." 257 Wis. at 133, 42 N. W .2d at 504 
(Brown, J., dissenting). 
9 See 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 4, at § 90-26. 
10 See, e.g., Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 34, 192 N.E. 668, 671 (1934). 
11 See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). 
12 See Weinstein, Antenuptia/ Agreements-What the Law Now Says, 62 ILL. B.J. 604, 
605 (1974). 
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earliest opinions recognizing their similarity was the dissent in the 
1950 case of Fricke v. Fricke. 13 The dissenting judge argued that 
both types of contracts should be enforceable under the same 
rules, provided the agreement in contemplation of divorce not be in 
fact an inducement to dissolution of the marriage. This opinion 
recognized that parties might enter into such agreements for proper 
reasons, and that the agreements at least should not be met with a 
presumption of invalidity. 14 
It was not until the early 1970's that other decisions began to 
reconsider the common law rule against agreements made in con-
templation of divorce. 15 In Posner v. Posner, 16 the Supreme Court 
of Florida faced the issue squarely and determined that antenuptial 
agreements settling alimony and property rights upon divorce 
should not be held void ab initio as contrary to public policy. The 
court held that if the safeguards applied to antenuptial agreements 
in contemplation of death were applied to similar agreements in 
contemplation of divorce, and if the divorce was prosecuted in 
good faith and upon proper grounds, the antenuptial agreement 
would be valid and enforceable. The court adopted the same 
three-alternative test which had been applied to antenuptial con-
tracts contemplating death by earlier Florida decisions. 17 For the 
agreement to be enforceable, there must be (1) a fair and equitable 
provision for the wife, (2) a full disclosure to the prospective wife 
of the prospective husband's worth, or (3) general knowledge by 
the prospective wife of the prospective husband's worth. 18 In 
addition, the court held that upon a showing of changed cir-
cumstances, such antenuptial contracts are subject to the same 
13 257 Wis. at 129, 42 N.W.2d at 502 (1950) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
14 In some jurisdictions such agreements can be admitted into evidence and considered by 
the divorce court in determining the equities of a property division. See, e.g., Strandberg v. 
Strandberg, 33 Wis. 2d 204, 147 N.W.2d 349 (1967). However, the agreements per se are 
unenforceable and the extent to which their provisions will be incorporated into the final 
decree rests within the court's discretion. 
The Michigan Supreme Court has taken a similar position. In Scherba v. Scherba. 340 
Mich. 228, 65 N .W.2d 758 (1954), the court held that the provisions of an antenuptial 
contract in contemplation of death may be used as a guide in determining an equitable 
property division upon termination of the marriage. 
15 While a 1960 Oklahoma case, Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960), enforced 
an antenuptial contract in which each spouse waived alimony rights upon divorce, the 
decision met with virtual nonacceptance, even by the courts within the same jurisdiction. 
See Gamble, supra note 5, at 715. Indeed, jurisdictions considering Hudson have specially 
noted that the court in that case did not overrule the older majority rule, but merely ignored 
it. See Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970). 
•
1
• 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972). 
17 See Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). 
18 Id. at 20. Florida courts have apparently not considered the equities to the husband in 
these cases. 
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modification provisions that apply to all support orders in divorce 
proceedings. 19 
_ Other states have recently begun to follow the Florida lead in 
reevaluating the old common law rule. ln Vo/id v. Vo/id, 20 an 
Illinois appellate court held that permitting "older persons" 21 to 
anticipate prior to marriage the possibility of divorce and to estab-
lish their rights by contract in case the marriage should be dis-
solved did not violate public policy. As with antenuptial contracts 
contemplating· death, the court held that the parties must enter into 
the contract contemplating divorce with full knowledge and with-
out fraud, duress, or coercion. 22 · 
The State of Oregon has also retreated from strict application of 
'the old common law rule, although under a somewhat different 
rationale. In Unander v. Unander, 23 the court stated that antenup-
tial agreements providing for a partial or complete waiver of 
alimony will be enforced, unless such enforcement deprives a 
spouse of support that he or she cannot otherwise secure. The 
court also required that the agreement be fairly made after a full 
disclosure of each party's assets. Finally, the court accepted the 
Florida limitation24 that, if the circumstances of the parties change, 
the court can modify the alimony provision just as it can modify a 
decree based upon a separation agreement that includes a support 
prov1s10n. 
Reform in this area has also taken place in community property 
jurisdictions. In Buettner v. Buettner, 25 the Nevada Supreme Court 
. 19 FLA .. STAT. ANN. § 61.14 (Supp. 1975). This statute provides for modification of 
support provisions incidental to a divorce based upon a showing of changed circumstances 
by either party. 
It should also be noted that Posner left open the question of whether a wife can waive all 
rights to alimony, temporary and permanent. The court's broad holding indicates that this is 
possible, so long as the disclosure requirements are met, and the agreement is free from 
fraud, duress, and overreaching. It is now clear, however, that a husband cannot conclu-
sively abrogate by antenuptial contract his obligation to pay temporary alimony. The Florida 
courts view such an agreement as unenforceable because it seeks to relieve the husband of 
his legal duty to support his wife during marriage. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 
1972). The question of whether a spouse can waive all rights to permanent alimony, 
however, still remains open. 
20 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972). 
21 Id. at 392, 286 N .E.2d at 47. It is unclear how this holding would relate to "younger 
persons," if at all. , · 
22 A subsequent decision, Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974), 
approved ihe Vo/id position, but emphasized that the provisions ofan antenuptial contract 
must be "fair and equitable" in order to be enforced. 24 Ill. App. 3d at 88,320 N .E.2d at 510. 
The Eule court also held that a wife cannot waive all rights to temporary alimony by 
antenuptial contract, as the husband's support duties continue until final termination of the 
marriage. Accord, Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972). 
23 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973). 
24 See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 
(Fla. 1972). . . 
25 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.~d 600 (1973). 
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declared that antenuptial contracts settling alimony and property 
rights on divorce are not void as against public policy. However, 
the court retained equitable power to refuse to enforce an antenup-
tial contract on the grounds that the contract is unconscionable or 
was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, material nondis-
closure, or duress. Yet, as the court noted, this limitation represents 
no departure from established law since courts exercise such 
power generally in all contract litigation. 
California, another community property state, has also begun a 
retreat from the rule prohibiting contracts in contemplation of 
divorce. In In re Marriage of Higgason, 26 the California Supreme 
Court stated; "[A]n agreement must be made in contemplation that 
the marriage relation will continue until the parties are separated 
by death. Contracts which facilitate divorce or separation by pro-
viding for a settlement only in the event of such an occurrence are 
void as against public policy. " 27 The California Supreme Court 
expressly disapproved this language in Dawley v. Dawley 28 by 
enforcing an antenuptial contract in which the parties agreed to 
hold their respective earnings and other property acquired during 
their marriage as separate property. The agreement by its terms did 
not expressly provide for divorce, but surrounding circumstances 
clearly indicated that the parties did not contemplate a lasting 
marriage. 29 The court rejected the wife's contention that the 
agreement violated public policy because it implied an early di-
vorce. The court further stated that the objective language of the 
contract itself controls and that an agreement violates public policy 
"only insofar as its terms encourage or promote dissolution. " 30 
Although all of the above decisions concern antenuptial agree-
ments, the same considerations appear to exist for postnuptial 
agreements which provide for settlement of rights upon divorce, 
but which do not contemplate or encourage an imminent separa-
tion. The leading example of the similarity between the treatment 
of antenuptial and postnuptial agreements comes from Arizona, a 
community property state. In 1969, the Arizona Supreme Court in 
In re Harber' s Estate 31 first held that a married couple may divide 
present and prospective property by postnuptial agi:eement, even 
immediately prior to an imminent separation or divorce. This deci-
26 JO Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, I 10 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973). 
27 10 Cal. 3d at 485, 516 P.2d at 295, I 10 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
28 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2588 (Cal. Sup. Ct., June 29, 1976). 
29 When the agreement was made, the wife was pregnant, unmarried, and in danger of 
losing her job as a schoolteacher because of her situation. The husband was also encouraged 
to enter into the agreement because the wife had threatened to institute a paternity suit 
against him, creating adverse publicity and jeopardizing his job. 
30 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) at 2588. 
31 104 Ariz. 79, 449 P.2d 7 (1969). 
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sion, as did those in Florida and Illinois, 32 required that the agree-
ment be free from fraud, coercion, and undue influence, and that 
the wife act with full knowledge of the property involved and her 
rights therein. It also imposed the additional limitation that the 
settlement be fair and equitable. 33 
In 1975; an Arizona appellate court, in Spector v. Spector, 34 
indicated that these same policy considerations apply to antenup-
tial agreements. The court held that even before marriage, parties 
can contractually settle their rights to present or future property in 
the event of divorce, whether or not the property is community or 
separate. On the basis of Barber's Estate, the court determined 
that applicable law did not prohibit prospective abrogation ofrights 
to community property. It thus found "no reason why an antenup-
tial contract should be accorded different legal treatment than a 
postnuptial contract. " 35 
In Capps v. Capps II, 36 the Virginia Supreme Court did not 
completely repudiate the old common law rule, but held that post-
nuptial agreements specifying property rights in the event of di-
vorce were not contrary to public policy unless they were collusive 
or actually facilitated a separation or divorce. 37 Applying this rule, 
the court enforced an agreement which provided that if either party 
instituted an action for divorce or separate maintenance, the wife 
would surrender her interest in the marital home, and the husband 
would assume all mortgage obligations. The court held that the 
agreement did not facilitate divorce or separation, but instead 
tended to promote continuation of the marriage. It is unclear how 
the court reached this conclusion because the husband filed for 
divorce and it was apparently in his financial interest to do so. 
Nevertheless, the court appeared to reject the traditional assump-
tion 38 that agreements providing one spouse with pecuniary ben-
efits in the event of a divorce are necessarily destructive of the 
marriage relationship. 
It is clear from this discussion that the law regarding agreements 
in contemplation of divorce is in a state of flux. Changes in the law 
32 See notes 16 and 20 and accompanying text supra. 
33 Accord, Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974). 
34 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975). 
35 Id. at 138, 531 P.2d at 183. 
36 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2086 (Va. Sup. Ct., Dec. I, 1975). 
37 It appears that the court meant that such an agreement will be more closely scrutinized 
in light of surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether the agreement itself 
caused the dissolution. This position sharply contrasts with that taken by the California 
court in Dawley v. Dawley, 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2588 (Cal. Sup. Ct., June 29, 1976), 
where the court stated that it will consider only the objective language of the agreement 
itself. 
38 See Gamble, supra note 5, at 705. 
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regarding such agreements have not come about by statute,39 but 
rather by judicial decisions which have repudiated the old common 
law approach. It should also be noted that compared to common 
law property states a disproportionate number of community prop-
erty jurisdictions have liberalized their rules and now permit the 
enforcement of agreements in contemplation of divorce. This situa-
tion may be attributable to the greater economic equality of marital 
partners under the community property regimes. 40 
As noted above, those jurisdictions which enforce such agree-
ments impose some limitations. 41 Courts often expressly require 
the agreement to be free from fraud and undue influence. While 
this rule generally applies to all contractual litigation, the presence 
of an express requirement indicates judicial recognition of the 
increased opportunities for fraud and coercion that exist in the 
confidential relationship between present or prospective spouses. 
The existence of this confidential relationship has also given rise in 
some jurisdictions to the requirement that complete financial dis-
closure must precede the making of an enforceable contract. 
While judicial recognition of the enforceability of agreements in 
contemplation of divorce may assist individuals in realistically 
planning for the future, the end result of such planning is by no 
means certain. In some states, the contractual provisions may be 
modified if either party demonstrates that circumstances have 
changed since they made the agreement. In others, the courts will 
refuse to enforce any provision that deprives a spouse of necessary 
support. The most significant limitation is the requirement in some 
jurisdictions that the agreement be fair and equitable. This 
amorphous standard handicaps individuals in their future planning 
because it is virtually impossible to predetermine what a court may 
find to be a fair provision. 
Despite such limitations, these decisions have been significant 
steps in the contemporary development of domestic relations and 
contract law. The traditional view still prevails in most 
jurisdictions-contracts that contemplate dissolution· of the mar-
riage by divorce are generally void as against public policy. The 
new trend, however, indicates a more thoughtful analysis rather 
than blind adherence to the stare decisis of the old common law 
rule. 
39 Even the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act does not deal with contracts in contempla-
tion of divorce. 
40 While a review of the law in all jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this article, it does 
appear that a greater proportion of community property states have adopted the new 
approach. See· notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra. 
41 This information has been compiled by jurisdiction in the APPENDIX attached hereto, 
and appears .in the same c,rd<:r as discussed.in .the text. 
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A wide variety of policy reasons have been offered in support of 
the common law rule that all antenuptial as well as virtually all 
postnuptial agreements in contemplation 9f divorce are void and 
unenforceable as against public policy. 42 These reasons are often 
confusing, and sometimes contradictory. For example, many 
courts have said that such agreements violate the sanctity of the 
marriage relationship by making it economically advantageous for 
one party of the marriage to seek divorce. 43 Other courts have 
noted that a disadvantageous agreement, if valid, could instead 
improperly force a party to endure an insufferable marriage rather 
than court economic disaster by pursuing divorce. 44 
The generally unstated assumptions which underlie these com-
ments are that society has an interest in the preservation or termi-
nation of marriage relationships and that the present refusal of 
most courts to enforce these marital agreements has a salutary 
effect on the underlying relationships. It is not at all clear, how-
ever, that these assumptions are valtd. Indeed, courts have not 
closely evaluated the process by which they determine property 
and support rights in general, and whether their present practices, 
whatever they are, might also have significant but unrecognized 
and unevaluated effects on the continuation or termination of mar-
riage relationships. 
Other policy reasons courts give for refusing to enforce these 
agreements include such technical niceties as a failure of consider-
ation. The marriage itself was thought by some to be the considera-
tion which upon dissolution could no longer support the agree-
ment. 45 Again, the decisions make little effort to evaluate whether 
the doctrine of consideration, developed primarily in commercial 
transactions, should be applied to marital agreements and, if so, 
how. 46 
Other courts have referred to society's continuing interest in the 
42 See 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 4, at § 4-1. 
43 See, e.g., Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950). See also Gamble, 
supra note 5, at 705; Note, Modern Theory and Practice of Antenuptial Agreements, 5 J. 
MAR.' J. PRAc. & PRoc. 179, 201 (1971). 
44 See Sanders v. Sanders, 40 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (1955). 
45 York v. Ferner, 59 Iowa 487, 13 N.W. 630 (1882). See also Note, supra note 43, at 199. 
46 Michigan cases have addressed the consideration issue only with respect to agreements 
in contemplation of death, and have held that marriage itself is sufficient consideration for 
either spouse's waiver of an interest in the other's estate. See MICHIGAN LAW REVISION 
COMMISSION, Antenuptial Agreements in Michigan, 3rd ANN. REP_- 67, 71 (1%8). The 
question remains whether the same rule would apply if-the current statute is amended as 
proposed to a·uthorize agreements in contemplation of divorce. See discussion in part III 
infra. · 
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financial support of its citizens. They consequently have refused to 
enforce those agreements which would render one of the spouses a 
ward of the state. 47 These courts take the position that it is prefera-
ble to impose the duty to maintain or support the ex-spouse upon a 
comparatively financially able spouse than to make the support of 
thi_s person the obligation of society as a whole. The obvious 
inequities of this position in circumstances such as a marriage of 
short duration reveal the often shallow, self-serving reasoning be-
hind such a policy. 
It might also be argued that notwithstanding the private agree-
ments of the parties, society has a duty to guarantee the rights of a 
dependent spouse even after the termination of the marriage. Al-
though such concerns are usually voiced in favor of wives, the 
courts occasionally require provision for a dependent husband. 48 
This argument derives from the fact that the rearing of children and 
the maintenance of the home require a substantial commitment of 
time and effort on the part of one or both of the spouses. If one 
spouse disproportionately made this commitment, it could be ar-
gued that the state should protect the spouse from financial need, 
even after divorce. The policy supposedly insures the continued 
willingness of marital partners to undertake the financially depen-
dent but socially necessary functions of childrearing and homemak-
ing. 49 This argument may not be consistent, however, with the 
changing circumstances of an increasing number and percentage of 
married women working outside the home or with the policy in 
favor of enforcement of marital agreements in contemplation of 
death. 
Whatever the stated reasons for refusing to enforce agreements 
in the event of divorce, they seem to suggest an underlying reason 
that these agreements are inherently unfair. Presumably the 
agreements do not take into consideration the traditional division 
of labor in the average household whereby the wife, even if she 
47 For example, the Supreme Court of Oregon has held that antenuptial agreements 
concerning alimony will be enforced "unless enforcement deprives a spouse of support that 
he or she cannot otherwise secure." Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 
721 (1973). 
48 In In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973), 
the California Supreme Court held invalid an antenuptial agreement in which a wealthy 73 
year-old woman and a 48 year-old waiter of little means waived their mutual rights to 
support. The court noted that the husband had become totally disabled after the agreement 
was made, and that the wife was able to provide support for the husband. Whether or not 
support duties continued after dissolution of the marriage was held to be a question for the 
court alone. IO Cal. 3d at 488, 516 P.2d at 297, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 905. 
49 Bartke, Community Property Law Reform in the United States and in Canada-A 
Comparison and Critique, 50-TuL. L. REV. 213, 262 (1976). Professor Bartke argues for a 
system of marital property that will guarantee the nonincome-producing wife an equal role in 
the ownership, management, and control of the family property. He believes that the 
preservation of the nuclear family is at stake. 
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works outside the home, foregoes substantial occupational ad-
vancement and consequently suffers a reduced future earning 
capacity .50 They do not take into account the disproportionate 
bargaining strength of the parties to the contract, especially where 
one spouse is significantly more affiuent than the other. They also 
fail to consider the duration of the marriage and the changes of 
circumstances that might occur during that time,51 as well as the 
difference in contributions which the spouses have made to the 
relationship and to the accumulation of property. 
Courts of equity, of course, do attempt to deal with these con-
siderations when determining property and support rights upon 
divorce. Some of them have expressly stated that they would not 
permit parties, by private agreement, to divest the equity courts of 
this discretionary jurisdiction. 52 
On the other hand, persuasive policy arguments can be made to 
support the enforcement of marital agreements in contemplation of 
divorce. The state should not lightly abrogate the freedom of indi-
viduals to plan for the future with some degree of certainty. Today, 
when more than one out of three marriages end in divorce,53 a 
party would be almost foolhardy not to recognize and minimize the 
risk that he or she is taking when entering into a marriage relation-
ship. 
Although it is probably impossible to survey accurately the kinds 
of people who would make use of marital agreements, one informal 
study found that most of them were older people who were enter-
ing into a second marriage. 54 These people had children or other 
financial obligations from their previous marriage for which they 
felt obligated to provide before entering into a new relationship. 
Other people likely to use these agreements include spouses with 
relatively equal earning power who wish to preserve their own 
assets for their respective estates in the event of either divorce or 
death. Finally, the most traditional use of the marital agreements is 
where spouses and their respective families wish to preserve inher-
ited estates intact for their own family descendents.55 The question 
50 See Note, supra note 43. at 187. 
51 One authority in the field of domestic relations has argued that the real reason for 
invalidating agreements in contemplation of divorce is that although the provisions may be 
fair when made, they may be unfair when the divorce or separation occurs. H. CLARK, LAW 
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 28-29 ()968). 
52 See Gamble, supra note 5. at 705. 
53 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note I, at 67. 
54 Gamble, supra note 5, at 730. 
55 See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). See also Note, supra 
note 43, at 200. 
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arises as to whether the courts and legislatures should continue to 
deprive these. people of their freedom to make such plans in the 
event of divorce. 
The fairness question is one which must be considered candidly 
on both sides of this issue. Divorce courts have not been univer-
sally acclaimed for the fairness with which they divide property 
and provide support. In fact, the arbitrariness evident in some of 
these proceedings has caused many to wonder whether individuals 
could not by agreement do at least as good a job, if not a substan-
tially better one. 
When courts suggest that the traditional rule promotes the main-
tenance of marriage, one must inquire whether the growing number 
of jurisdictions which provide no-fault divorce have abdicated their 
interest in the maintenance of marriages which one or both of the 
parties wish to terminate. 56 There is also the question whether the 
state actually has an overriding interest in requiring former spouses 
to support each other so that they do not become charges on the 
public, and if so, to what limitations should this interest be subject. 
In view of the nature and extent of these conflicting policies, the 
question remains which side of the issue yields the better result. An 
examination of the cases and commentators does not reveal a clear 
answer to this question. Rather, it appears that there have been 
unfair results in divorce proceedings, irrespective of whether or 
not the jurisdictions involved authorize marital agreements in con-
templation of divorce. Our legal system operates least effectively 
when it attempts to deal most comprehensively and fairly with 
matters of domestic concern. Marriage is not strictly a commercial 
venture. Yet it does contain, without question, major financial 
aspects. People who live and work together and raise a family are 
tied closely to each other in economic as well as emotional and 
social ways. How these economic expectations should best be 
protected by society is the real issue. 
Although neither the combined arguments for or against agree-
ments in contemplation of divorce are overwhelmingly convincing, 
consistency with other laws dealing with similar matters is itself a 
significant value. Treatment of agreements in contemplation of 
death should be reviewed from this perspective. The question is 
whether the policies with respect to a surviving spouse's rights 
should be substantially different from those with respect to a di-
vorced spouse's rights. The old arguments regarding the preserva-
tion of marriage are of no persuasive effect in states which provide 
56 It has also been noted that where no minor children are involved, and where the 
spouses can function independently in society, the state has little interest in the continuaton 
of the marriage. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391, 286 N.E.2d 4_2, 46 (1972). 
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for no-fault divorce or which tolerate a divorce rate of greater than 
thirty-three percent.57 Likewise, the interest of the state in requir-
ing former spouses to support each other so that they do not 
become wards of society is no greater in the event of death, where 
it is not required, than in the event of divorce, where it is. In short, 
there seems to be no policy argument which outweighs the value of 
consistency in the treatment of these marital contracts, regardless 
of whether the marriage terminated by death or by divorce. 
Planning for the division of property and support obligations 
upon termination of a marriage should not turn upon technical legal 
refinements, such as consideration,58 or the distinction between 
alimony and property division.59 Rather, it should be hedged with 
real p"rotection so that the parties enter into the agreement freely, 
without coercion, fraud or duress, and with a full and fair under-
standing of the nature of their partner's assets and the kinds of 
interests which they are giving up by virtue of the agreement. 
Complicated statutes have been proposed authorizing these 
kinds of agreements. One proposal sets forth in detail the relative 
duties of the parties to inquire into and to disclose the nature of 
their personal assets, and creates presumptions and burdens of 
proof in the event of litigation. 60 This approach can be unduly 
burdensome and may not guarantee the equitable results it at-
tempts to provide. In any event, agreements could be drafted to 
include sufficient recitals to show the scope of the information to 
which the parties were privy. 
Finally, it should be observed that even those jurisdictions which 
enforce these agreements attach additional limitations to them.61 
Some states still maintain a broad interest in the support of the 
waiving spouse. As a result, they may permitjudicial modification 
of the agreement whenever there is a showing of changed cir-
57 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note I, at 68. 
58 See note 46 supra. 
59 The distinctions between alimony and property division which have been developed in 
some cases appear to be distinctions without a difference. See Gamble, supra note 5, at 708. 
If a party is ordered to pay substantial alimony, there is probably no need for a property 
division in that the alimony might well serve the same purpose. 
It should also be noted that the present Michigan statute authorizing agreements in 
contemplation of death deals with support and property without making any distinction. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 702.74a (Supp. 1975). 
60 See Gamble, supra note 5, at 733. Gamble proposes separate statutes for agreements 
stipulating property rights and those stipulating alimony rights. Under both provisions, 
however, each spouse must be represented by independent counsel, there must be a listing 
of each spouse's interest in specific types of property, and the agreement must be' acknowl• 
edged before a notary public. Compliance with these provisions raises an irrebuttable 
presumption of full disclosure and a further presumption of validity. Noncompliance raises 
no presumption, and the contesting spouse has the burden of proving material concealment, 
misrepresentation, or fraud. With respect to alimony, neither an unreasonable provision nor 
the absence of a provision has any effect upn enforceability or the burden of proof. 
6 ' See the APPENDIX attached hereto. 
SPRING 1977] Agreements Contemplating Divorce 409 
cumstances.62 Other states hold the agreement unenforceable if it 
deprives a spouse of support that he or she cannot otherwise 
secure.63 Following this view, a statute could authorize the courts 
to set aside an agreement, but only to the extent of assuring some 
minimal standard of support for each of the spouses. If properly 
defined, this power would limit the uncertainty spouses would face 
upon divorce. The standard of support could be defined as subsis-
tence (welfare level), middle income, or the style to which the 
spouse has become accustomed. The minimum standard could 
depend upon the level at which public policy deemed it necessary 
for the court to intervene, or could be based upon the parties' prior 
standard of living. 
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN MICHIGAN 
Considerations such as those outlined above have led the Michi-
gan Law Revision Commission to propose to the Michigan Legisla-
ture some liberalization of the law regarding marital agreements.64 
The prior Michigan law was based upon a statute enacted in 196965 
as a result of an earlier proposal of the Commission. 66 That statute 
authorized virtually all marital agreements made in contemplation 
of death, and postnuptial agreements made in contemplation of 
divorce but only where the parties had already separated. By its 
silence, the Legislature left intact the common law which invali-
dates almost all antenuptial agreements dealing with property and 
support rights made in contemplation of divorce, as well as similar 
postnuptial agreements made before separation.67 
In its recent proposal, the Commission recognized that concepts 
of public policy with respect to marital agreements have changed 
substantially over the years. It found that no overriding public 
policy exists today which should preclude the enforceability of 
62 See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 
2d 530 (Fla. 1972). 
63 See, e.g., Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973). 
64 MICHIGAN LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Recommendation Relating to Marital Agree-
ments, 12th ANN. REP. (to be publfshed 1977). The study report submitted with the Commis-
sion's Recommendation was written by the author of this article. 
65 M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 702.74a (Supp. 1975). Section 74a was added to Act No. 
288 of the Public Acts·of 1939 ("the probate code") by Act No. 139 of the Public Acts of 
1969 (effective March 20, 1970). 
66 MICHIGAN LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Recommendation Relating to Antenuptial and 
Marital Agreements, 3d ANN. REP. 27 (1968). 
67 Scherba v. Scherba, 340 Mich. 288, 65 N.W.2d 758 (1954); In re Muxlow's Estate, 367 
Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d 43 (1962). , 
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marital agreements in contemplation of divorce, regardless of 
whether they were made before or after marriage or separation. It 
therefore proposed legislation which would authorize the enforce-
ment of all such marital agreements, whenever executed under 
certain conditions applicable to both divorce and death situations. 
This proposal included the continuation of the requirements that 
these agreements be made in writing, upon fair disclosure, and in 
ihe absence of fraud or duress. The Commission went one step 
further, however, in recognizing that the consequences of such 
agreements to the parties may be the same regardless of whether 
the marriage terminates by death or divorce. It proposed, for both 
kinds of agreements, that a court of equity should have the right to 
modify such agreements where there has been a change of cir-
cumstances which would make the enforcement of the agreement 
unfair or inequitable. This power to modify did not exist in the 
prior law and it represents a significant change in that statute as 
well as in the older common law relating to agreements in contem-
plation of death. 
By recommending the above changes, the Commission properly 
recognized that marital agreements, whether in contemplation of 
divorce or death.and whether executed before or after marriage or 
separation, raise basically the same policy considerations. The 
<:;:ommission's choice of deferring to a court of equity in the event 
of changed circumstances reflects the confidence that the end 
results will be fairer than a firm adherence to the terms of the 
contract. The Commission apparently believed that what might be 
lost in terms of predictability would be gained in terms of fairness. 
The Commission's confidence in the equity system may be mis-
placed. Unless a change of circumstances is more narrowly de-
fined, any court might be justified in setting aside a marital agree-
ment which conflicts with the way the court itself would have 
distributed the property. Mere passage of time could be considered 
a change of circumstance which might induce some judges to 
impose their view of fairness upon parties, notwithstanding their 
prior written agreement. 
It should be noted that the law in Michigan, as in other jurisdic-
tions, has permitted marital agreements in contemplation of di-
vorce to be used as the de facto basis for pending divorce settle-
ments .68 Thus, it might be concluded that the Commission sought, 
by its recommendations, to elevate marital agreements in contem-
68 Scherba v. Scherba, 340 Mich. 288, 65 N.W.2d 758 (1954). 
Other jurisdictions have taken this view. In Strandberg v. Strandberg, 33 Wis. 3d 204, 147 
N.W.2d 349 (1967), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that although an antenuptial agree-
ment contemplating divorce is void, it can be admitted into evidence and used as a guide in 
determining the equities of a property division. 
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plation of divorce from being de facto guides for property distribu-
tion to providing a legal basis for distribution when the enforce-
ment of such an agreement would be fair. Such a result would not 
yield the full measure of predictability that parties may have de-
sired. Yet it may represent the biggest step a legislature would be 
willing to take toward that predictability. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Compromises like the one achieved by the Michigan Law Revi-
sion Commission will continue to be worked out. It will neverthe-
less be difficult to achieve the proper balance between predictabil-
ity and fairness. Our fluctuating attitudes toward the economic role 
of women will make such compromises extremely difficult to apply 
in individual cases. Further, assumptions regarding the economic 
independence of women may be disadvantageous to women who 
have chosen not to work outside of the home. The failure to make 
these assumptions, however, may create a heavy burden on hus-
bands held to support their prior family as well as their second 
family, depite their former wives' potential for self-sufficiency. 
The fact that our society has not decided who should support 
whom, under what circumstances, and for how long makes the 
question of divorce settlement extremely difficult. 
As inarital agreements in contemplation of divorce gain greater 
usage, however, they may by their terms be drafted to provide for 
greater flexibility to accommodate the parties' change of cir-
cumstances. without judicial interference. The agreements could 
provide allowances for subsequent changes due to health, number 
of children, ability to work, and so on, with a reasonable provision 
for both spouses in the event one or more of these conditions 
should occur. 
The need for such agreements is quite clear. The millions of 
people who are likely to appear in a divorce court ought to have the 
means to provide some predictable financial results if. such an 
event should occur. Elaboration of these agreements and the com-
promises that will be worked out in the future will hopefully re-
solve these questions so that these arrangements will be workable 
and . maybe even beneficial for all parties co1_1cemed. 
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APPENDIX 
Express Limitations Placed On 
Contracts In Contemplation of Divorce 
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By Jurisdictions Recognizing Their Enforceability 
JURISDICTION 
LIMITATION Fla. Ill. Ore. Nev. Cal. Ariz. Va. 
Absence of Fraud X X X X X 
or Duress 
Divorce Must be 
Prosecuted in X X 
Good Faith 
Fair and Equitable X* X X 
Provisions 
Full Disclosure X* X X X X 
General Knowledge 
of Other Spouse's X* 
Assets 
Modification on X X 
Changed Circumstances 
No Waiver of X X 
Temporary Alimony . 
Enforcement Must Not 
Deprive Spouse of X 
Necessary Support 
Unconscionable 
Contract Not X 
Enforceable 
Terms of Contract 
Must Not Encourage X X** 
Divorce 
*alternative requirement 
**court looks to external circumstances as well as objective Ian-
guage in order to determine whether or not the contract encour-
aged divorce. 

